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On Optimal Secure Message Transmission by
Public Discussion
Hongsong Shi, Shaoquan Jiang, Reihaneh Safavi-Naini, Mohammed Ashraful Tuhin
Abstract—In a secure message transmission (SMT) scenario a
sender wants to send a message in a private and reliable way to a
receiver. Sender and receiver are connected by n vertex disjoint
paths, referred to as wires, t of which can be controlled by
an adaptive adversary with unlimited computational resources.
In Eurocrypt 2008, Garay and Ostrovsky considered an SMT
scenario where sender and receiver have access to a public discus-
sion channel and showed that secure and reliable communication
is possible when n ≥ t + 1. In this paper we will show that
a secure protocol requires at least 3 rounds of communication
and 2 rounds invocation of the public channel and hence give
a complete answer to the open question raised by Garay and
Ostrovsky. We also describe a round optimal protocol that has
constant transmission rate over the public channel.
Index Terms—SMT, public discussion, round complexity, MPC.
I. INTRODUCTION
DOlev, Dwork, Waarts and Yung [5] introduced SecureMessage Transmission (SMT) systems to address the
problem of delivering a message from sender S to receiver
R in a network guaranteeing reliability and privacy. S is
connected to R by n node disjoint paths, referred to as wires,
t controlled by the adversary with unlimited computational
power.
A perfectly secure message transmission or PSMT for short,
guarantees that R always receive the sent message and the
adversary does not learn anything about it. It was shown that
PSMT is possible if and only if n ≥ 2t + 1. See [5], [17],
[18], [2], [8], [13] for more references. Franklin and Wright
[9] relaxed the security requirement of SMT protocols and
proposed probabilistic security in which two parameters ε and
δ upper bound the advantage of the adversary in breaking
privacy, and the probability that R fails to recover the sent
message, respectively. In a PSMT protocol ε = δ = 0. In this
paper we refer to these protocols as almost SMT protocols.
We refer interested readers to [7], [12], [1], [15].
Franklin and Wright [9] also considered a model where an
additional reliable broadcast channel is available to S and R.
A broadcast channel guarantees that all nodes of the network
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receive the same message. We refer to this model as Broadcast
Model (BM). They showed that PSMT in this model requires
n ≥ 2t + 1, but probabilistic security can be obtained with
n > t and gave a 3-round (0, δ) protocol in this model.
Garay and Ostrovsky [11] replaced the broadcast channel
with an authentic and reliable public channel that connects S
andR. A public channel is totally susceptible to eavesdropping
but is immune to tampering. We refer to this communication
model as Public Discussion Model (PDM). Garay and Ostro-
vsky [11] gave a 4 round protocol with probabilistic security
when n > t, which shows that the connectivity requirement
for PDM is the same as the broadcast model.
Efficiency parameters of SMT protocols are, (i) the number
of rounds where each round is one message flow between S
and R, or vice versa, and (ii) the communication efficiency
measured in terms of transmission rate which is the total
number of bits sent over all wires for a message divided by
the length of the secret.
Round complexity in PDM is measured by a pair (r, r′)
where r is the total number of rounds and r′ is the number of
rounds that the public channel is invoked (r ≥ r′).
Related models: Pubic channel has been used in other
contexts including unconditionally secure key agreement [14]
where the public channel is used for the advantage distil-
lation, information reconciliation and privacy amplification.
The public channel in this case is a free resource and its
communication cost is not considered. In PDM however, the
cost of realizing a channel in a distributed system is taken into
account.
A. Our Results
Garay et al. [11] proposed a (4, 3)-round protocol and
subsequently improved its round complexity to (3, 2)-round
[10]. However it was not known if this round complexity was
optimal.
The main result of this paper is to prove that the minimum
values of r and r′ for which an (r, r′)-round (ǫ, δ) protocol
can exist are 3 and 2, respectively. This answers the question
of round optimality of almost SMT protocols in PDM that was
raised in [11].
Our results on round optimality are obtained in three steps.
We first prove that there is no (2, 2)-round (ε, δ) protocol in
PDM with ε+δ < 1−1/|M| when n ≤ 2t, where M denotes
the message space. This means that message transmission
protocols in PDM with (2, 2)-round complexity will be either
unreliable, or insecure.
In the second step we will show that when the invocation of
the public channel does not depend on the protocol execution
2TABLE I
MAIN RESULTS ON LOWER BOUNDS OF CONNECTIVITY AND ROUND OF SMT PROTOCOLS IN PDM
Type Resiliency Round Construction Transmission Rate
(ε, δ)
ε+ δ < 1− 1
|M|
n ≤ 2t (2,2) Impossible(Theorem 2)
(ε, δ)∗
ε+ δ < 1− 1
|M|
and δ < 1
2
(1 − 1
|M|
)
n ≤ 2t (r, 1), r ≥ 3 Impossible(Theorem 3)
(ε, δ)-PD-adaptive∗∗
3ε+ 2δ < 1− 3
|M|
n ≤ 2t (3, 1) Impossible(Theorem 4)
(0, δ) n > t (3, 2)
√
[9], [10], (Theorem 5)
[9], [10]: O(n) on wires and public channel
ours: O(n) on wires and O(1) on public channel
when the length of message is Ω((n log δ)2)
∗ the invoker of public channel is fixed initially in the protocol
∗∗ the invoker of public channel is not fixed initially but adaptive to real execution of the protocol
and is statically determined as part of protocol description,
there is no (r ≥ 3, 1)-round (ε, δ) protocol with ε + δ <
1− 1/|M| and δ < 12 (1− 1/|M|) when n ≤ 2t.
Then we generalize this result to the case that the invoker of
the public channel is not fixed at the start of the protocol and is
adaptively determined in each execution, and show that there
is no (3, 1)-round (ε, δ) protocol with 3ε+ 2δ < 1− 3/|M|.
We also construct a round optimal protocol that has constant
transmission rate over the public channel when the length of
message (i.e., log |M|) is Ω((n log δ)2) bits long.
Table I summarizes our results and puts them in relation to
others’ works.
B. Discussion
One of the main motivations for studying SMT is to reduce
connectivity requirement in secure multiparty protocols [3],
[4], [16]. Secure multiparty protocols require a secure and
reliable channel between every two nodes and so require the
network graph to be complete. Using an SMT protocol one
can simulate secure connection between any two nodes using
a network with sufficient connectivity, that is n disjoint paths
(and not direct link) between any two nodes where n > 2t.
Secure message transmission in PDM can further reduce
connectivity (n > t) as long as there is an authentic public
channel. This is the lowest possible connectivity and shows
that two nodes can securely communicate as long as there
is one uncorrupted path between them (and a public channel).
Realizing a public channel in an point-to-point sparse network
however is costly. For example it is possible to simulate such
a channel using almost-everywhere broadcast protocol [11]
that uses almost-everywhere Byzantine agreement protocol [6].
It is shown [19] that in degree-bounded networks agreement
on a single bit using almost-everywhere agreement protocol
requires at least O(logN) rounds communication, where N
is the number of nodes in the network.
The high cost of simulating the public channel is the moti-
vation for reducing the number of invocation and transmission
rate of such a channel.
C. Organization
Section 2 describes the security model and relevant defini-
tions. Lower bounds on round complexity of SMT protocol in
PDM are proved in Section 3. Section 4 describes an round
optimal (0, δ)-SMT by public discussion protocol. Finally we
draw a conclusion in Section 5.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Model and Notations
Network model. We assume a synchronous, connected point-
to-point incomplete network. Players S and R are connected
by n vertex-disjoint paths, called wires. In addition to the
wires, we assume there is an authentic and reliable public
channel between S and R. Messages over this channel are
publicly accessible and are correctly delivered to the recipient.
All wires and the public channel are bidirectional. SMT
protocols proceed in rounds. In each round, one player may
send a message on each wire and the public channel, while
the other player will only receive the sent messages. The sent
messages will be delivered before the next round starts.
Adversary model. The adversary A is computationally un-
bounded. A can corrupt nodes on paths between S and
R. A wire is corrupted if at least one node on the path
is corrupted. We assume up to t ≤ n − 1 wires can be
corrupted by the adversary. A can eavesdrop, modify or block
messages sent over the corrupted wires. A is assumed to
be adaptive, meaning that she can corrupt wires during the
protocol execution based on the communication traffic it has
seen so far.
We also consider static adversary by which we mean that
the adversary chooses the corrupted wires before the start of
the protocol. A static adversary will however act adaptively
during the protocol execution with regard to messages that
are sent over the corrupted wires: in each round the adversary
sees the traffic over all the corrupted wires and the public
channel before tampering the traffic over the corrupted wires
in that round.
Notations. Let M be the message space. Let MS denote the
secret message of S, and MR the message output by R. We
use ⊥ to denote null string and ∅ to denote empty set. The
notation u ← U denotes that a value u is sampled uniformly
from a set U .
3B. Definitions
The statistical distance of two random variables X,Y over
a set U is given by,
∆(X,Y ) =
1
2
∑
u∈U
∣∣∣Pr[X = u]− Pr[Y = u]
∣∣∣. (1)
Lemma 1: [20] Let X,Y be two random variables over
a set U . The advantage of any computationally unbounded
algorithm D : U → {0, 1} to distinguish X from Y is
|Pr[D(X) = 1]− Pr[D(Y ) = 1]| ≤ ∆(X,Y ).
In an execution of an SMT protocol Π, S wants to send
MS ∈ M to R privately and reliably. We assume that at the
end of the protocol, R always outputs a message MR ∈M.
An execution is completely determined by the random coins
of all the players including the adversary, and the message
distribution of MS . For P ∈ {S,R,A}, the view of P
includes the random coins of P and the messages that P
receives. Denote by VA(m, cA) the view of A when the
protocol is run with MS = m and A’s randomness CA = cA.
Definition 1: A protocol between S and R is an (ε, δ)-
Secure Message Transmission by Public Discussion
(SMT-PD) protocol if the following two conditions are sat-
isfied:
• Privacy: For every two messages m0,m1 ∈M and cA ∈
{0, 1}∗, it has
∆(VA(m0, cA), VA(m1, cA)) ≤ ε,
where the probability is taken over the randomness of S
and R.
• Reliability: R recovers the message MS with probability
larger than 1− δ, or formally
Pr[MR 6= MS ] ≤ δ,
where the probability is over the randomness of players
S,R and A, and the choice of MS .
Observe that the above definition is oblivious of the message
distribution, meaning that given an SMT-PD protocol, it will
be secure with the same privacy and reliability parameters
regardless of the concrete distribution over M.
III. ROUND COMPLEXITY OF SMT-PD PROTOCOL
By the similarity of broadcast model and public discussion
model, we recall Franklin and Wright’s results [9] in our
language as follows.
Theorem 1: [9] If n ≤ 2t, then: (i) For any values r ≥
r′, it is impossible to construct (r, r′)-round (0, 0)-SMT-PD
protocols; (ii) For any values r > 0 and 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1, it is
impossible to construct (r, 0)-round (ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD protocols
with δ < 12 (1 −
1
|M|).
In this section, we will prove when n ≤ 2t any (ε, δ)-SMT-
PD protocol needs (3, 2)-round complexity. This is by proving
that: (i) secure (2, 2)-round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocols do not
exist, and (ii) for any (3, 1)-round protocol, either privacy or
reliability can be compromised.
The following lemma plays a central role in proving the
impossibility results in this paper. Loosely speaking, the
lemma shows that for an (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol no algorithm
that is given the adversary’s view as the input, can output MS
with a probability much better than random guess.
Lemma 2: Let Π be an (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol and assume
S selects MS ←M. Then no adversary A can correctly guess
MS with probability larger than ε+ 1/|M|. That is,
Pr[MA = MS] ≤ ε+ 1/|M|,
where MA denotes the adversary’s output, and the probability
is taken over the random coins of S,R and A.
In proving Lemma 2, we need the Lemma 3 below (See
Appendix A for its proof).
Lemma 3: Consider an (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π and an
adversary B that plays the following game: the challenger C
sets up the system; B selects two messages M0,M1 from M
and gives them to a challenger C who selects b← {0, 1} and
runs the protocol (by simulating S,R) to transmit Mb. B can
corrupt up to t wires and finally outputs a bit b′.
Let BΠ(Mb)() be the output of B when b is selected by C
in the simulation. Then
∣∣∣Pr[BΠ(M0)() = 1]− Pr[BΠ(M1)() = 1]
∣∣∣ ≤ ε, (2)
where the probability is taken over the randomness of C and
B.
Proof: (of Lemma 2) The proof is by contradiction:
assume that there is an adversary A that can output MA with
probability Pr[MA = MS] > ε + 1/|M|. We will construct
an algorithm B to invalidate Eq.(2) .
The code of B is as follows: B randomly chooses two
messages (M0,M1) ∈M and asks its challenger C to transmit
one of the two messages. C chooses a bit b ← {0, 1} and
simulates S,R to run protocol Π in transmitting Mb. B runs
adversary A as a subroutine to attack the protocol. B answers
A’s queries by forwarding them to the challenger and returning
the results back to A. At the end of the protocol A outputs
a message in M (which can be different from M1 and M0).
B outputs 1 if A outputs M1, and outputs 0, otherwise. Note
that B will have the complete view of A. Then
Pr[BΠ(M1)() = 1]
= Pr[MA = M1 | C has chosen M1] > ε+ 1/|M|,
and
Pr[BΠ(M0)() = 1]
= Pr[MA =M1 | C has chosen M0] = 1/|M|.
(3)
Note that Eq.(3) follows by that fact that M1 is chosen
independent of M0 and the randomness of players S and R
in the simulation of C and so the probability of A’s output
to be equal to M1 (which is chosen randomly) is at most the
probability of random guess which is 1/|M|. Hence, we have
Pr[BΠ(M1)() = 1] − Pr[BΠ(M0)() = 1] > ε, contradicting
Corollary 3.
4A. Impossibility of (2, 2)-Round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD Protocol when
n ≤ 2t
The impossibility proof needs to analyze the actions of the
adversary in rounds, hence we start by decomposing an SMT-
PD protocol into rounds as follows.
Definition 2: For a (r, r′)-round SMT-PD protocol, the
functionality of the protocol is described as a sequence of
randomized functions (f1, . . . , fr, g).
The function fi denotes the round encoding function that
is used to generate the traffic sent in the i-th round. The input
of fi consists of the received messages of previous rounds
and random coins of the caller. For a player P ∈ {S,R},
CP denotes the random coins of P , and MiP denotes the set
of all messages received by P during the first i rounds with
M
0
S = {MS} and M0R = ∅. If the initiator of round 1 ≤ i ≤ r
is P , we write PiXiYi = fi(Mi−1P , CP ) to denote the random
variable corresponding to traffic in round i; here Pi denotes
the traffic over the public channel, and Xi and Yi denote the
traffic over the corrupted wires and the uncorrupted wires,
respectively, or vice versa.
The function g denotes the decoding function. By the end
of the protocol R outputs MR = g(MrR, CR).
Theorem 2: Let n ≤ 2t. Then there is no (2, 2)-round
(ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol with ε+ δ < 1− 1/|M|.
The proof is by contradiction: suppose there exists a (2, 2)-
round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π with ε + δ < 1 − 1/|M|.
We construct an adversary A that breaks the privacy of Π by
impersonating R. We show that for each execution of Π where
S sends a message m to R, there exists a second execution
called swapped execution where S sends the message m but
A impersonates R such that S receives identical traffic in
the two executions and so cannot distinguish the two. The
views of R and A are however swapped in the two executions,
and so if R outputs MR = MS in one of the executions,
then A outputs MA = MS in the swapped execution and so
Pr[MA = MS ] ≥ Pr[MR = MS ]. Using Lemma 2 and that
Π is an (ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD protocol, we have ε+ δ ≥ 1− 1/|M|
which is a contradiction.
Proof: Assume by contradiction that there is a (2, 2)-
round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π with ε+δ < 1−1/|M|, and
the message distribution over M is uniform. Suppose wires
are labeled by 1, 2, . . . , n, and n = 2t. (Note if there exists an
(ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol for n′ < 2t, the same protocol can be
run for n = 2t by neglecting the last n − n′ wires. Thus an
impossibility result for n = 2t still holds for n′ < 2t.)
The adversary is assumed to be static in the following. That
is, the corrupted wires are selected at the start of the protocol.
The impossibility results obtained for such adversary will hold
for more powerful adaptive adversaries who will corrupt the
wires during the running of the protocol.
We write A’s randomness as CA = (CA0, CA1) where
CA0 ∈ {0, 1} is used to select one of the two sets of t wires:
{1, . . . , t} or {t+1, . . . , 2t} for corruption and CA1 ∈ {0, 1}∗
is used for encoding and decoding of the traffic. Let CA0 = 0
and CA0 = 1 denote the first and the last t sets of wires will
be corrupted, respectively.
Before going ahead, we remark that: (i) The last round
message of a SMT-PD protocol can only be from S to R
as otherwise it can be removed without affecting the output
of R. (ii) For generality we don’t assume the interaction in
a SMT-PD protocol should be back-and-forth, meaning that
some consecutive rounds of the protocol may have the same
sender and cannot be combined into one round. Under the
effect of public channel, this provides a possible paradigm in
designing SMT-PD protocols. E.g., both of the first two rounds
of the protocol in [11] are from S to R, and are from R to
S in [10].
Therefore, depending on the order of the first round, a 2-
round SMT-PD protocol has two kinds of interactions.
CASE 1. In this case, the first round traffic is from R to S,
while the second round is from S to R. Assume CA0 = 1,
i.e., the last t wires are corrupted. We illustrate the strategy
of A in Fig. 1 and formalize it as follows.
• Round 1: When R sends P1X1Y1 = f1(CR); A com-
putes P1X ′1Y ′1 = f1(C′R) where C′R is the value com-
puted from CA1 and results in P1 over the public channel,
hence A can leave the transmission over the public
channel unchanged. This is always possible because the
function table of f1 is public and A is computationally
unbounded. Thus A can find the set of random strings
such that Ω = {r | f1(r) = P1X ′1Y ′1} and selects
C′R ← Ω. A will then replaces Y1 by Y ′1 .
• Round 2: When S generates message P2X2Y2 =
f2(MS, P1X1Y
′
1 , CS), A blocks the transmission over the
corrupted wires and outputs MA = g(P2Y2, C′R).
Let E be the set of all executions of Π in presence
of A. We consider a binary relation W over E such that
(E, Eˆ) ∈W if, (i) MS , CS are the same in the two executions;
(ii) CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; and (iii) CRˆ = C′R, C′Rˆ = CR, where
‘ ˆ ’ in the superscript denotes the random coins used and
messages output by A and R in Eˆ, respectively. Note that in
the two executions, the t corrupted wires are swapped with
the uncorrupted ones such that the messages received by A
and R are swapped as shown in Fig. 1 and 2.
For a pair of (E, Eˆ) ∈W, the first round messages received
by S in E and Eˆ are identical and equal to P1X1Y1. Thus
in the second round, S will generate the same traffic P2X2Y2
in both E and Eˆ, and so if R outputs MR in E, A will
output MAˆ = MR in Eˆ since MR = g(P2X2, CR) =
g(P2X2, C
′
Rˆ
) = MAˆ.
Let pE be the probability that execution E is running.
Similarly define pEˆ . Denote by S ⊆ E the set of executions
with MR = MS and so we have Pr[MR = MS] =
∑
E∈S pE .
Now MAˆ =MS holds in Eˆ if MR = MS holds in E and so
we have Pr[MA = MS ] ≥
∑
E∈S pEˆ .
Observe that pE is completely determined by the probability
of selecting MS and other random coins of all the players. For
any two executions (E, Eˆ) ∈ W, we note that (MS , CS) =
(MSˆ , CSˆ), while CR and CRˆ are both selected with uniform
probability. Moreover, when CR and CRˆ are fixed, both of the
probability of selecting CA and CAˆ are 2
−1−⌈log |Ω|⌉
. We thus
get pE = pEˆ .
5S (MS ,CS) A (CA0,CA1) R (CR)
finds C′R,
P1X
′
1Y
′
1 = f1(C
′
R)
P1X1Y
′
1
oo P1X1Y1 = f1(CR)
P1X1Y1
oo
P2X2Y2 =
f2(MS , P1X1Y
′
1 , CS)
P2X2Y2
//
blocks Y2, computes
MA = g(P2Y2, C
′
R)
P2X2
// MR = g(P2X2, CR)
Fig. 1. An execution E of Π in the presence of adversary A with CA0 = 1.
S (MS ,CS) A (CAˆ0,CAˆ1) R (CRˆ)
C′
Rˆ
= CR,
P1X1Y1 = f1(C
′
Rˆ
)
P1X1Y
′
1
oo
CRˆ = C
′
R,
P1X
′
1Y
′
1 = f1(CRˆ)
P1X
′
1Y
′
1
oo
P2X2Y2 =
f2(MS , P1X1Y
′
1 , CS)
P2X2Y2
//
blocks X2, computes
MAˆ = g(P2X2, C
′
Rˆ
)
P2Y2
// MRˆ = g(P2Y2, CRˆ)
Fig. 2. The swapped execution Eˆ of E with C
Aˆ0
= 0 and C
Rˆ
= C′
R
, C′
Rˆ
= CR .
Then by Lemma 2 and above argument,
1− δ ≤ Pr[MR = MS] ≤ Pr[MA =MS ] ≤ 1/|M|+ ǫ. (4)
Therefore, it has ε + δ ≥ 1 − 1/|M|, which contradicts the
assumption on Π.
CASE 2. In this case, both of the two rounds traffic are from
S to R. Intuitively, if n ≤ 2t and S receives no feedback from
R, A can just block the traffic over the t corrupted wires such
that R has no advantage over A in recovering MS .
More specifically, considering two executions E and Eˆ in
this case, where the random coins of A and R are swapped,
and the corrupted and uncorrupted wires are also swapped. If
A blocks the t corrupted wires, the view of R in E will equal
the view of A in Eˆ. Then if R outputs MS in one execution,
A will output it in the swapped execution. By Lemma 2 and
the assumption on Π, Eq. (4) holds also in this case, thus it
follows that ε+ δ ≥ 1− 1/|M|.
B. Impossibility of (r, 1)-Round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD Protocol when
n ≤ 2t
Theorem 2 shows that optimal (ǫ, δ)-SMT-PD protocols
need at least 3 rounds, while Theorem 1 shows that at least
one round public channel invocation is necessary. A natural
question thus is to find out if secure (r ≥ 3, 1)-round SMT-
PD protocols can exist. As a warm-up, the following theorem
gives a negative answer to the case that the invoker of public
channel is specified initially in the protocol.
Theorem 3: Let n ≤ 2t and r ≥ 3. Then a (r, 1)-round
(ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol with fixed invoker of public channel
has either ε+ δ ≥ 1− 1|M| or δ ≥
1
2 (1−
1
|M|).
The proof is by contradiction: assume there exists a (r, 1)-
round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π with fixed public channel
invoker, where values of ε and δ do not satisfy any of the
above inequalities. We construct an adversary who can break
either the privacy or the reliability of Π.
A’s strategy is to block the traffic (over the t corrupted
channels) sent by the invoker of public channel, and to replace
the traffic (over the t corrupted wires) sent to the invoker
by forged traffic that is constructed according to the protocol
description. Then,
1) If the public channel is invoked by S, we will show that
S cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which
she has the same views. The two executions have the
property that if R outputs MR = MS in one execution
then A outputs MA = MS in the swapped execution.
Using an argument similar to Theorem 2 we prove that
the adversary can break the privacy of the protocol and
thus obtain ε+ δ ≥ 1− 1|M| .
2) If the public channel is invoked by R, we will show that
R cannot distinguish two swapped executions in which
he has the same views. If in one execution R outputs
MS , he will output MA in the swapped execution with
the same probability. The two executions have the same
probability and so when MS 6= MA, we prove the
adversary can break the reliability of the protocol and
so obtain δ ≥ 12 (1−
1
|M|).
Proof: We stress that in this proof the invoker of the
public channel is already specified in the protocol, whereas the
actual invocation round of the public channel can be adaptive
to the protocol execution. The impossibility result will hold
straightforwardly for the case that the invocation round of the
public channel is a part of the protocol specification.
As noted in the proof of Theorem 2, the interaction order
in the protocol is not necessarily back-and-forth, and the last
round is from S to R. Moreover, we also suppose the message
distribution over M is uniform, and n = 2t and the adversary
is static.
We separate the randomness CA (of A) into four parts:
(CMA , CA0, CA1, CA2), where CA0 ∈ {0, 1} is used to choose
one of the two subsets of t wires to corrupt (CA0 = 0 and
CA0 = 1 are used for the first or the last t wires, respectively),
CA1 is used to generate traffic for substituting the message
sent by S, CA2 for generating traffic to substitute the message
sent by R, and CMA denotes the randomness of A uniformly
selecting a message from M to impersonate S’s traffic.
6S (MS ,CS) A (CMA ,CA0,CA1,CA2) R (CR)
X1Y1 = f1(MS , CS)
X1Y1
// blocks Y1
X1
//
X ′2Y
′
2 = f2(Y1, CA2)
X2Y
′
2
oo X2Y2 = f2(X1, CR)
X2Y2
oo
X ′3Y
′
3 = f3(Y1, CA2)
X3Y
′
3
oo X3Y3 = f3(X1, CR)
X3Y3
oo
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
PiXiYi =
fi(MS , X2Y
′
2 , . . . , CS)
PiXiYi
// blocks Yi
PiXi
//
X ′i+1Y
′
i+1 =
fi+1(Y1, . . . , CA2)
Xi+1Y
′
i+1
oo
Xi+1Yi+1 =
fi+1(X1, . . . , CR)
Xi+1Yi+1
oo
Xi+2Yi+2 =
fi+2(MS , X2Y
′
2 , . . . , CS)
Xi+2Yi+2
// blocks Yi+2
Xi+2
//
.
.
.
.
.
.
oo .
.
.
oo
XrYr =
fr(MS, X2Y
′
2 , . . . , CS)
XrYr
// blocks Yr
Xr
// MR = g(X1, . . . , Xr, CR)
Fig. 3. The behaviors of A in an execution where the public channel is used by S and CA0 = 1.
CASE 1. [S invokes the public channel.] We show that in
this case A will break the privacy of Π. Without loss of
generality, assume CA0 = 1. We describe the action of A
as follows: in round 1 ≤ j ≤ r,
• When S sends XjYj or PjXjYj , A blocks Yj .
• When R sends XjYj , A computes X ′jY ′j =
fj(M
j−1
A , CA2), then replaces Yj by Y ′j . (Here Mj−1A
denotes the messages eavesdropped by A during the first
j − 1 rounds.)
Finally, A outputs MA = g(MrA, CA2).
The above strategy of A is also shown in Fig.3. Note that A
can block and forge messages as above since A can randomly
select CA to generate messages {X ′jY ′j }, and make them
consistent with the requirement of protocol Π. Also note that
CMA = ⊥ and CA1 = ⊥ since A needs not to impersonate S
in this case.
Let E be the set of executions of Π. We define a binary
relation W1 over E to specify two executions E and Eˆ as
follows: (E, Eˆ) ∈W1 if: (i) (MS , CS) are the same for both
executions; (ii) CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; and (iii) CA2 = CRˆ and
CR = CAˆ2.
Claim 1: (i)The view of S in E is the same as her view in
Eˆ; and (ii)the view of A in Eˆ is identical to the view of R
in E. Thus the output of R in E is the same as the output of
A in Eˆ. That is, MR = MAˆ holds.
Proof: Without loss of generality assume in execution E
we have CA0 = 1 and the public channel is used in round i.
Also assume during the first i− 1 rounds, R is the initiator of
rounds {r1, . . . , rℓ} ⊆ {1, . . . , i−1}, ordered nondecreasingly.
We first prove statements (i) and (ii) hold during the first
rℓ rounds, then using the same technique we will prove the
statements hold in the later rounds and thus prove MR = MAˆ.
The proof is by induction over ℓ. When ℓ = 0, the state-
ments (i) and (ii) hold trivially from the facts that S doesn’t
receive messages in the first i−1 rounds and CAˆ0⊕CA0 = 1.
For each j < r, suppose that the statements (i) and (ii) hold
in the first rj rounds for ℓ = j. The induction hypothesis states
that MrjR = {Xk}k<rj and M
rj
A = {Yk}k<rj are swapped,
while MrjS are the same in executions E and Eˆ. Our objective
is to prove that the statements (i) and (ii) also hold during the
first rℓ rounds for ℓ = j+1. Note that in all those rounds k for
rj < k < rj+1, transmissions are only from S to R. Formally
the message of each round k is XkYk = fk(MrjS , CS), and
R and A will receive {Xk}rj<k<rj+1 and {Yk}rj<k<rj+1
respectively. Thus Mrj+1−1R = M
rj
R ∪ {Xk}rj<k<rj+1 and
M
rj+1−1
A = M
rj
A ∪ {Yk}rj<k<rj+1 . As CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1, it
follows that Mrj+1−1R and M
rj+1−1
A are swapped in E and Eˆ.
Let Xrj+1Y ′rj+1 = f
(1)
rj+1(M
rj+1−1
R , CR)f
(2)
rj+1(M
rj+1−1
A , CA2)
be the messages received by S in round rj+1 of E. Then S
will receive the same messages in round rj+1 of Eˆ because
CA2 = CRˆ, CR = CAˆ2, and then M
rj+1−1
R and M
rj+1−1
A are
exchanged in E and Eˆ. Thus the statements (i) and (ii) hold
during the first rj+1 rounds.
Henceforth, S will send XkYk = fk(MkS , CS) =
fk(M
rℓ
S , CS) in each later round k for rℓ < k < i. Observe
that in these rounds S won’t receive messages from R. Thus
if S invokes the public channel in round i of E, it will do
the same in Eˆ. And it follows that the view of MiR and
M
i
A in E and Eˆ are swapped during the first i rounds. A
similar argument shows that after the i-th round S will receive
identical messages in the two swapped executions. Finally, the
views of S in the two executions will be the same, but MrR and
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A are swapped in E and Eˆ. At the end of the protocol, we
have MR = g(MrR, CR) = g(MrAˆ, CAˆ2) = MAˆ, where M
r
Aˆ
denotes the messages that A has eavesdropped in execution
Eˆ.
Let S1 ∈ E be the set of all successful executions in which
R outputs MR = MS , and pE denotes the probability of
execution E determined by the random coins of all players.
Define pEˆ similarly. Then Pr[MR = MS ] =
∑
E∈S1
pE .
By Claim 1, if E ∈ S1, A will output MS in the swapped
execution of Eˆ; therefore Pr[MA = MS] ≥
∑
E∈S1
pEˆ .
Additionally, by the definition of W1 and the observation
of CMA = CA1 = ⊥ in this case, we have,
pE =
1
|M|
2−rS−rR−rA2−1 = pEˆ , (5)
where rS , rR, rA2 denote the length of the random coins of
CS , CR, CA2 used by S,R and A respectively.
Now by Eq.(5), and Lemma 2, it follows that Eq.(4) also
holds in this case, then it yields that 1 − 1|M| ≤ ε + δ,
contradicting the assumption on Π.
CASE 2. [R invokes the public channel.] We will show
that in this case the reliability of Π will be broken. This is
by showing that for every successful execution there exists an
unsuccessful one and so probability of success is at most 1/2.
Formally, the strategy of A is similar to CASE 1, that is
when CA0 = 1, then in each round 1 ≤ j ≤ r:
• When R sends XjYj or PjXjYj , A blocks Yj .
• When S sends XjYj , A computes X ′jY ′j =
fj(M
j−1
A , CA1) and replaces Yj by Y ′j . (Here Mj−1A
denotes the messages selected and eavesdropped by A
during the first j − 1 rounds.)
Note that CA2 = ⊥ in this case. For simplicity, we abuse the
notation MA here to denote the uniformly selected message
of A using coins CMA .
Let E and pE be as defined in CASE 1 and consider a
binary relation W2 over E where (E, Eˆ) ∈ W2 if: (i) CR
is the same in the two executions; (ii) CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; and
(iii) CA1 = CSˆ , CS = CAˆ1; (iv) MS = MAˆ and MA = MSˆ .
Denote by S2 the set of successful executions in which R
outputs MR =MS under the condition that MA 6=MS .
Claim 2: For each swapped execution pair (E, Eˆ) ∈ W2,
the views of R in E and Eˆ are identical and so if E ∈ S2 is
a successful execution, then Eˆ /∈ S2 is a failed execution.
Proof: Without loss of generality, assume R invokes the
public channel in round i of E, and during the first i rounds S
is the initiator of rounds {r1, . . . , rℓ} ⊆ {1, . . . , i−1} (ordered
in nondecreasing order) in execution E. By induction on ℓ, we
can prove that R will receive the same messages during the
first rℓ rounds of the two swapped executions. This means that
R will invoke the public channel in the same round i of E
and Eˆ, both. Furthermore, we can prove R will receive the
same messages during the later rounds of the two executions.
Thus, we have MrR = MrRˆ, where M
r
Rˆ
denotes all messages
that R received in Eˆ. The proof is similar to Claim 1.
Now because MS and MA are swapped in E and Eˆ, if
R outputs MR = g(MrR, CR) = MS in E, he will output
MRˆ = g(M
r
Rˆ
, CR) = MAˆ = MS in Eˆ. Thus for any two
swapped executions (E, Eˆ) ∈W2 when MA 6= MS , we have
Eˆ /∈ S2.
Claim 3: (i) The occur probability of any two swapped
executions (E, Eˆ) ∈W2 is the same; that is pE = pEˆ ; and (ii)
When MS 6= MA, the failure probability of R in recovering
the secret message is not less than the success probability of
R; formally
Pr[MR = MS |MS 6= MA]
≤ Pr[MR 6= MS |MS 6=MA],
where the probability is taken over the random coins and
messages selected by S,R and A.
Proof: (i) Note that an execution E ∈ E is completely
determined by the random coins and messages selected by
all the players. Then for each E ∈ E, we have pE =
1
|M|2
−rS−rR−rA , where rS , rR and rA denote the length of
the random coins of CS , CR and CA, respectively. Similarly,
we have pEˆ =
1
|M|2
−rSˆ−rRˆ−rAˆ .
As CA2 = ⊥ in this case, it has rA = rMA + rA0 + rA1,
where rMA , rA0, rA1 denote respectively the length of CMA ,
CA0, CA1. Similarly, it has rAˆ = rMAˆ + rAˆ0 + rAˆ1.
Note that rA0 = rAˆ0 = 1 and rMA = rMAˆ = ⌈log |M|⌉.
By the definition of W2, we have that rR = rRˆ, rS = rAˆ1
and rA1 = rSˆ . Hence it has rS + rR + rA = rSˆ + rRˆ + rAˆ,
and then pE = pEˆ holds.
(ii) Let S¯2 = E \ S2 denote the set of failed executions.
Since Eˆ ∈ S¯2 holds for any E ∈ S2, and the one-to-one
correspondence of E and Eˆ, we get that |S2| ≤ |S¯2|. The
probability that Π fails when MA 6=MS can be computed as,
Pr[MR 6= MS |MS 6=MA]
= Pr[E ∈ S¯2]
≥
∑
E∈S2
pEˆ
=
∑
E∈S2
pE
= Pr[MR = MS |MS 6=MA].
From Claim 3 we must have Pr[MR 6=MS |MA 6= MS] ≥
1
2 ; hence
Pr[MR 6=MS ]
≥ Pr[MR 6=MS |MS 6=MA] Pr[MS 6=MA]
≥ 12 (1 −
1
|M|).
On the other hand, since Π is a δ reliable protocol, we have
Pr[MR 6= MS ] ≤ δ. It follows that δ ≥ 12 (1 −
1
|M|), which
contradicts the assumption on Π.
C. Impossibility of (3, 1)-Round PD-adaptive (ε, δ)-SMT-PD
Protocol
Theorem 3 says when the invoker of public channel is
known at the start of the protocol, then (r, 1)-round SMT-PD
protocol is impossible. In this section we consider protocols
that allow the invoker of public channel depends on the
executions; or more precisely depends on the random coins of
players. We call this type of SMT-PD protocols PD-adaptive.
Definition 3: A (r, r′)-round SMT-PD protocol Π is called
PD-adaptive if the invoker of the public channel and the
8round of invocation of the public channel are not specified
at the start but depend on CS , CR, CA and MS .
More specifically, for each round 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let player
P ∈ {S,R} be the initiator of the round. Let Mi−1P be
the set of all messages received by P during the first i − 1
rounds and that M0S = {MS} and M0R = ∅. We denote by
PiXiYi
def
= fi(M
i−1
P , CP ) the traffic of round i, where Pi
denotes the traffic over the public channel, and Xi and Yi
are the traffic over the two sets of wires, one all corrupted
and one all uncorrupted.
Traffic on the public channel, that is Pi = ⊥ or Pi 6= ⊥ is
determined by Mi−1P and CP . Moreover, it must have Pj = ⊥
if the public channel has been used r′ times before round j.
Theorem 4: Let n ≤ 2t. Then a PD-adaptive (3, 1)-round
(ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol must have
3ε+ 2δ ≥ 1−
3
|M|
.
Proof: Suppose Π is an arbitrarily PD-adaptive (3, 1)-
round (ε, δ)-SMT-PD protocol. We construct a static adversary
A that breaks privacy or reliability of Π and so prove that
3ε + 2δ ≥ 1 − 3|M| should hold for any Π. The message
distribution is assumed to be uniform in this proof.
A selects the first or last t wires to corrupt. In the rounds
before invocation of the public channel, A conducts man-
in-the-middle attack between S and R by tampering with
the corrupted wires. When player P ∈ {S,R} uses public
channel, A simply blocks the corrupted wires and continues
to cheat P by tampering the later transmissions (from the other
player P¯ to P ) over the corrupted wires until the end of the
protocol.
Observe that despite P¯ will learn the locations of corrupted
channels, but since the public channel has been used, P¯ cannot
notify P . ThusA can continue to cheat P in the later execution
of the protocol. We will prove that A can conduct the above
attack and thus violate the privacy or reliability of the protocol.
We use [A − B − C] to indicate the initiators of the first,
second and third rounds are A, B and C, respectively. The
proof is divided into four steps stated as lemmas, each proving
an impossibility result for an interaction order. The omitted
proofs can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 4: If the interaction order of protocol Π is [S−S−
S], then ε+ δ ≥ 1− 1|M| .
Proof: The invoker of public channel in this case must be
S and so A only blocks the traffic over the corrupted wires.
This is an special case of Theorem 2 and we have ε + δ ≥
1− 1|M| .
Lemma 5: If the interaction order of protocol Π is [S−R−
S], then ε+ δ ≥ 12 −
1
|M| .
Lemma 6: If the interaction order of protocol Π is [R −
R− S], then 3ε+ 2δ ≥ 1− 3|M| .
Lemma 7: If the interaction order of protocol Π is [R −
S − S], then ε+ δ ≥ 12 −
1
|M| .
The above argument shows that a protocol with order [R−
R − S] may have better security than protocols with other
interaction orders. However, even in this case, the protocol
cannot guarantee privacy and reliability at the same time. This
completes the proof.
IV. AN ROUND OPTIMAL SMT-PD PROTOCOL
As noted earlier the modified version of the protocol in
[10] has optimal round complexity but has linear (in n)
transmission rates over the wires and the public channel, while
the complexity of protocol in [9] is similar.
In this section we describe a (3, 2)-round (0, δ)-SMT-
PD protocol with constant transmission rate over the public
channel, and O(n) transmission rate over the wires (when the
message is long enough).
A. Our Construction
The proposed protocol uses universal hash functions.
Definition 4: Let m > ℓ. A function family H = {h :
{0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ} is called γ-almost strongly universal2
hash function family if given any a1, a2 ∈ {0, 1}m, a1 6= a2,
and any b1, b2 ∈ {0, 1}ℓ, it holds that Prh∈H[h(a1) = b1 ∧
h(a2) = b2] ≤ γ.
1) (S −→ R): For i = 1, . . . , n, S randomly selects
ri ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and Ri ∈ {0, 1}m and sends the pair
(ri, Ri) to R along wire i.
2) (S P←− R): For i = 1, . . . , n, if R correctly
receives a pair (r′i, R′i) along wire i (i.e., r′i ∈
{0, 1}ℓ, R′i ∈ {0, 1}
m), he selects hi ← F and
computes T ′i = r′i ⊕ hi(R′i); otherwise, wire i is
assumed corrupted. He then constructs an indicator
bit string B = b1b2 · · · bn where bi = 1 if the wire i
is corrupted and bi = 0 otherwise. Finally, he sends
(B, (H1, . . . , Hn)) over the public channel, where
Hi = (hi, T
′
i ) if bi = 0; and Hi is empty, otherwise.
3) (S P−→ R): S ignores the wires with bi = 1. For
i = 1, . . . , n, if bi = 0, S computes Ti = ri⊕hi(Ri)
and checks T ′i
?
= Ti; if Ti = T ′i , wire i is assumed
consistent; otherwise, wire i is corrupted.
S constructs an indicator bit string V = v1v2 · · · vn,
where vi = 1 if wire i is considered consistent;
otherwise vi = 0. Finally, she publishes the pair
(V,C =MS ⊕ { ⊕
vi=1
Ri}) over the public channel.
R recovers the message: When gets (V,C), R
recovers MR = C ⊕ { ⊕
vi=1
R′i} and outputs it.
Fig. 4. The (3, 2)-round (0, δ)-SMT-PD protocol Π1
Corollary 1: Let H = {h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ} be a γ-
almost strongly universal2 hash function family. Then, for any
(a1, c1) 6= (a2, c2) ∈ {0, 1}m × {0, 1}ℓ, Prh∈H[c1 ⊕ h(a1) =
c2 ⊕ h(a2)] ≤ 2ℓγ.
Proof: For equality c1⊕ h(a1) = c2⊕ h(a2), if a1 = a2,
then c1 = c2 . Thus we only consider the case of a1 6= a2.
Since
Pr
h∈H
[c1 ⊕ h(a1) = c2 ⊕ h(a2)]
=
∑
b∈{0,1}ℓ
Pr
h∈H
[h(a1) = c1 ⊕ b ∧ h(a2) = c2 ⊕ b].
9From Definition 4, Prh∈H[h(a1) = c1⊕b∧h(a2) = c2⊕b] ≤ γ
and so Prh∈H[c1⊕h(a1) = c2⊕h(a2)] ≤ 2ℓγ, and the result
follows.
Wegman and Carter [21] constructed a 21−2ℓ-almost
strongly universal2 hash family F = {h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}ℓ}.
Functions in F can be described by O(ℓ logm) bits and
computed in polynomial time. The short description length
of the family F allows us to authenticate messages with
low communication complexity. The protocol Π1 transmits
MS ∈ {0, 1}m to R is described in Fig. 4.
Theorem 5: The protocol Π1 is a (3, 2)-round (0, (n− 1) ·
21−ℓ)-SMT-PD protocol. Moreover, Π1 is polynomial time
computable, and its transmission rate is O(n) over the wires
and constant over the public channel when m = Ω(n2κ2),
where κ is the reliability parameter of the system with
δ = (n− 1) · 21−ℓ = 2−κ.
Proof: Let Cor = {i | wire i is corrupted}, and Con =
{i | wire i is consistent}.
• Reliability: If S can detect all corrupted wires with
(r′i, R
′
i) 6= (ri, Ri), the protocol is thus perfectly reliable;
otherwise, one such a wire will break the reliability. Using
Corollary 2, we show this probability is small. A more
formal proof follows.
In the second round the wires with bi = 1 are detected
as corrupted, and are ignored in the third round. Hence
in the following we only consider wires with bi = 0. For
wire i, the wire is called bad if (ri, Ri) 6= (r′i, R′i) but
ri⊕hi(Ri) = r′i⊕hi(R
′
i). Bad wires are always included
in Con. Using Corollary 1 and noting that ri, Ri, r′i, R′i
are fixed before the second round and then hi is selected
with uniform distribution, we have
Pr[wire i is bad ]
= Pr[ri ⊕ hi(Ri) = r
′
i ⊕ hi(R
′
i) ∧ (ri, Ri) 6= (r
′
i, R
′
i)]
≤ Pr[ri ⊕ hi(Ri) = r
′
i ⊕ hi(R
′
i) | (ri, Ri) 6= (r
′
i, R
′
i)]
≤ 21−ℓ,
where the probability is over the random coins of all the
players.
Then, the probability of unreliable message transmis-
sion is
Pr[MR 6= MS] = Pr[⊕j∈ConRj 6= ⊕j∈ConR
′
j ]
≤ Pr[∃j ∈ Con s.t. Rj 6= R′j ]
≤ Pr[∃ at least one bad wire]
≤
∑
j∈Cor Pr[wire j is bad ]
≤ (n− 1) · 21−ℓ,
where the probability is over the random coins of all the
players.
• Perfect Privacy: The intuition for proving perfect privacy
is as follows: the adversary can obtain transmissions
related to MS only from the public channel in round 3.
However, MS is masked by Ri (if wire i is uncorrupted),
and the adversary knows nothing about Ri because the
only transmission which depends on Ri is in the second
round invocation of public channel (h(Ri)) which is
masked by ri and is not known by the adversary. This is
true because ri was only transmitted on a secure wire i.
A more formal proof follows.
Let MS = m∗ be the message chosen by S and CA =
cA denotes the value of A’s coin. We first describe A’s
view in the protocol. Observe that in protocol Π1 Cor
is formed completely in the first round since the last two
rounds are only over the public channel. Then in the first
round A sees {(ri, Ri)}i∈Cor over the corrupted wires
and modifies them into {(r′i, R′i)}i∈Cor. In the second
and third round, A sees respectively (B, (H1, . . . , Hn))
and (V,M ⊕ {⊕Ri}i∈Con) over the public channel.
Since {(r′i, R′i)}i∈Cor is computed by A using cA and
{(ri, Ri)}i∈Cor (in adaptive way), and when A knows
{(r′i, R
′
i)}i∈Cor and {hi}i∈Cor, she can compute ({r′i ⊕
hi(R
′
i)}i∈Cor, B) and (⊕i∈Cor∩ConRi, V ) by herself,
we thus remove the computable part from her view and
describe it as a 4-tuple of random variables as follows,
VA(m
∗, cA) = (cA, V1, V2, V3)
= (cA, {(ri, Ri)}i∈Cor,
({hi}ni=1, {ri ⊕ hi(Ri)}i/∈Cor),m
∗ ⊕ (⊕i/∈CorRi)).
(6)
where Vi is A’s view in round i.
For two messages m0,m1 and CA = cA, the statistical
distance between VA(m0, cA) and VA(m1, cA) is given
by,
∆(VA(m0, cA), VA(m1, cA))
= 12
∑
v | Pr[VA(m0, cA) = v]− Pr[VA(m1, cA) = v] |,
where the probability is over the choices of CS and CR.
Then the term Pr[VA(m0, cA) = v] is given by,
Pr[VA(m0, cA) = v]
=
∑
{cS ,cR:VA(m0,cA)=v}
Pr[CS = cS ∧ CR = cR].
Note that CS and CR are independent and have length
n(m+ ℓ) and wk respectively, where w is the Hamming
weight of the string B and k is the description length
of function in F . Hence Pr[CS = cS ∧ CR = cR] =
1
2n(m+ℓ)+wk
; note this value is independent of the value
of m0.
Therefore we only need to count the number of exe-
cutions in which the coin tosses of the sender and the
receiver are such that random variable VA(m0, cA) = v.
Suppose that v = (cA, V1, V2, V3) is fixed, it implies
that Cor and cR = {hi}ni=1 are also determined; then the
choices of {(ri, Ri)}i/∈Cor should be consistent with V2
and V3. Since ⊕i/∈CorRi = V3 ⊕m0, when m0, V3 are
fixed, at most n− |Cor| − 1 elements in {Ri}i/∈Cor can
be selected freely. Moreover, when V2 and {Ri}i/∈Cor
are fixed, {ri}i/∈Cor are also determined. Therefore, the
number of CS , CR result in VA(m0, cA) = v are bounded
by the number of Ri for i /∈ Cor. Totally, they have
2m(n−|Cor|−1) different choices. Hence we have,
Pr[VA(m0, cA) = v] =
2m(n−|Cor|−1)
2n(m+ℓ)+wk
.
The proof is complete by noting that the above prob-
ability is independent of m0.
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• Complexity: Since the hash function is polynomial time
computable in m, the computation complexity of S and
R are polynomial in n and m. For communication
complexity, Π1 needs to communicate m + ℓ bits over
each wire, and at most (4s logm + ℓ + 2)n + m bits
over the public channel, where s = ℓ + log logm. If the
reliability requirement is set to δ = 2−κ = (n−1) ·21−ℓ,
then ℓ = κ + log(n − 1) + 1. The transmission rate
over the public channel assuming m = Ω(n2κ2), is
((4s logm+ ℓ+ 2)n+m)/m which is constant asymp-
totically.
B. Comparisons with Schemes in [9], [10]
As noted earlier communication over public channel is
much more costly than communication over wires, and so
minimizing the transmission rate over the public channel will
have a large effect on overall efficiency of the protocol. This
is particularly important for transmitting long messages. For
example in most cases κ = 30 provide sufficient reliability.
However messages can be as long as 220 bits. When n = 30
wires are available, our proposed protocol transmits around
220 bits over the public channel with reliability higher than
1 − 2−30 (since m > n2κ2). The protocols in [9], [10] both
have transmission rate O(n) and so need to send almost 30
times data (30× 220 ≈ 225 bits) over the public channel. The
reliability is 1−2−O(m) = 1−2−220 in [9], [10], which would
be unnecessarily high.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH
In this work we considered round optimality protocols for
secure message transmission (SMT) by public discussion. This
is an important communication model in realizing almost-
everywhere multiparty computation. Since the implementation
cost of public channel is high, it is important to minimize
transmission over the pubic channel. Our results show that
secure protocol in this model need at least 3 rounds and in 2 of
them the public channel must be invoked. We prove this result
in a general setting where the invocation of public channel is
not known at the start of the protocol and depends on the coin
tosses of participants. We describe a round optimal protocol
that has constant transmission rate over the public channel and
linear transmission rate over other wires.
Existence of PD-adaptive SMT-PD protocols with r ≥ 4
rounds and one round public discussion, and construction of
round optimal protocols with optimal communication com-
plexity over wires and public channel (if there exists) are
interesting open problems.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof for Lemma 3
Proof: By Definition 1 and Lemma 1 we have: For
any algorithm D, any two messages m0,m1 ∈ M, and any
adversary B with randomness cB ∈ {0, 1}∗,
|Pr[D(VB(m0, cB)) = 1]− Pr[D(VB(m1, cB)) = 1]| ≤ ε,
(7)
where the probability is over the random coins of S and R.
Note here VB(m, c) is (the random variable of) the view of B
when the (fixed) message m ∈ M is transmitted and B uses
the (fixed) coins CB = cB in the protocol.
11
Then by taking average over the randomness of CB , the
following holds from Eq.(7)
|Pr[D(VB(m0)) = 1]− Pr[D(VB(m1)) = 1]| ≤ ε , (8)
where VB(m) denotes the view of B when the fixed message
m ∈ M is transmitted in the protocol, and it is a random
variable over the random coins of S,R and B.
The adversary’s strategy consists of: selecting messages
(M0,M1) followed by attacking the protocol and so we write
B = (B1,B2). We use CB1 to denote the random coins used
by B1 to select (M0,M1). Let p0
def
= Pr[B
Π(m0)
2 () = 1] and
p1
def
= Pr[B
Π(m1)
2 () = 1]. We have,
∣∣Pr
[
BΠ(M0)() = 1
]
− Pr
[
BΠ(M1)() = 1
]∣∣
=
∣∣∑
CB1=c
Pr[CB1 = c] (p0 − p1)
∣∣
≤
∑
CB1=c
Pr[CB1 = c] |p0 − p1|
≤ ε .
The last step follows from the observation that |p0 − p1| ≤ ε
due to (8).
B. Proofs Omitted From Theorem 4
As in the proof of Theorem 3, we separate A’s random
coins into four parts: (CMA , CA0, CA1, CA2). For the sake of
clarity, the message selected by A using randomness CMA is
denoted by MA, while the message outputted by A by the end
of the protocol is denoted by M+A .
1) Proof of Lemma 5:
The public channel can be used in any of the three rounds.
For simplicity, we assume CA0 = 1, i.e., A selects the last
t wires to corrupt. The actions of A is illustrated as in Fig.
6, 7 and 8 respectively. (We remark that when CA0 = 0, A’s
action is similar.) The detail of A selecting (MA, CA1, CA2)
when S doesn’t use the public channel in the first round is
supplied in Fig. 5.
We remark that: (i) When S doesn’t use public channel
in round 1 and Ω2 6= ∅, the strategy as described in Fig.
5 ensures that A can produce message X ′2Y ′2 without public
channel communication in the second round. (ii) Since A is
computationally unbounded, she knows f1 and f2’s function
tables and so knows the sets Ω1 and Ω2. Thus A can conduct
the above attacks.
We analyze the success probability of A in the following.
Let E1 and E3 denote the events that S invokes the public
channel in round 1 and 3, respectively. Let E2 be the event
that R invokes the public channel in round 2. Then E1, E2
and E3 are disjoint events and Pr[E1 ∨ E2 ∨ E3] = 1 since Π
is a (3, 1)-round protocol.
Assume in the first round S sends X1Y1 and let the sets
Ω1 ⊆M× {0, 1}∗ and Ω2 ⊆ Ω1 × {0, 1}∗ be defined as
Ω1
def
= {(m, c1) | f1(m, c1) doesn’t use
public channel }
and
Ω2
def
= {(m, c1, c2) | (m, c1) ∈ Ω1, c2 ∈ {0, 1}∗
s.t. f2(X ′1Y1, c2) doesn’t use public
channel where X ′1Y ′1 = f1(m, c1)}.
We have (MS , CS) ∈ Ω1. If Ω2 6= ∅, A randomly chooses
(MA, CA1, CA2) ← Ω2; otherwise, A randomly chooses
(MA, CA1, CA2)← Ω1 × {0, 1}∗.
Fig. 5. The strategy that A selects (MA, CA1, CA2) when S
doesn’t use public channel in round 1.
Claim 4: Let b ∈ {1, 3}. If Eb occurs, we have
Pr[M+A = MS | Eb] ≥ Pr[MR =MS | Eb].
Proof: (i) We first prove the case of b = 1. Denote by E1
the set of all executions where E1 occurs, and by S1 ⊆ E1 the
set of successful executions in which R outputs MR =MS .
Define a relation W1 ⊆ E1 × E1, where (E, Eˆ) ∈ W1
if: (i) MS, CS remain unchanged in the two executions; (ii)
CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; (iii) CA2 = CRˆ, CR = CAˆ2.
Similar to CASE 1 in Theorem 2, we can prove that S
cannot distinguish two swapped executions (E, Eˆ) ∈W1 and
so if MR = MS , we have M+Aˆ = MS . Furthermore, we have
pE =
1
|Φ|2
−rA−rR = pEˆ , where Φ ⊆M× {0, 1}
rS is the set
of all (MS , CS) such that E1 occurs, and rS , rA, rR denote
the length of the randomness used by S,A,R, respectively.
We then obtain,
Pr[M+A = MS | E1] ≥
∑
E∈S1
pEˆ
=
∑
E∈S1
pE
= Pr[MR =MS | E1].
(ii) When b = 3, let E3 be the set of all executions where E3
occurs, and S3 ⊆ E3 be the set of all successful executions in
whichR outputsMR = MS . Define a relation W3 ⊆ E3×E3,
where (E, Eˆ) ∈ W3 if: (i) MS , CS and MA, CA1 remain
unchanged in the two executions; (ii) CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; (iii)
CA2 = CRˆ, CR = CAˆ2.
Then by a similar proof of CASE 1 in Theorem 2, we have
M+
Aˆ
=MR.
For any two executions (E, Eˆ) ∈ W3,
suppose (MS , CS , CR, CA) = (mS , cS, cR, cA) and
(MSˆ , CSˆ , CRˆ, CAˆ) = (mSˆ , cSˆ , cRˆ, cAˆ). Then the
probability that E occurs is pE = Pr[(MS , CS) =
(mS , cS) ∧ CR = cR ∧ CA = cA | E3] = α · β, where
α = Pr[(MS , CS) = (mS , cS) | E3] and β = Pr[CA =
cA ∧ CR = cR | (MS , CS) = (mS , cS) ∧ E3]. Similarly, it
has pEˆ = Pr[(MSˆ , CSˆ) = (mSˆ , cSˆ) ∧ CRˆ = cRˆ ∧ CAˆ = cAˆ |
E3] = αˆ · βˆ, where αˆ = Pr[(MSˆ , CSˆ) = (mSˆ , cSˆ) | E3] and
βˆ = Pr[CAˆ = cAˆ ∧ CRˆ = cRˆ | (MSˆ , CSˆ) = (mSˆ , cSˆ) ∧ E3].
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S (MS ,CS) A (CA0,CA2) R (CR)
P1X1Y1 =
f1(MS , CS)
P1X1Y1
// blocks Y1
P1X1
//
X ′2Y
′
2 =
f2(P1Y1, CA2)
X2Y
′
2
oo
X2Y2 =
f2(P1X1, CR)
X2Y2
oo
X3Y3 =
f3(MS , X2Y
′
2 , CS)
X3Y3
//
blocks Y3,
computes M+A =
g(P1Y1, Y3, CA2)
X3
//
MR =
g(P1X1, X3, CR)
Fig. 6. An execution of Π with order [S −R− S], where CA0 = 1 and S uses the public channel in round 1.
S (MS ,CS) A (CA0) R (CR)
X1Y1 =
f1(MS , CS)
X1Y1
//
selects
(MA, CA1, CA2),
X ′1Y
′
1 = f2(MA, CA1)
X1Y
′
1
//
blocks Y2
P2X2
oo
P2X2Y2 =
f2(X1Y
′
1 , CR)
P2X2Y2
oo
X3Y3 =
f3(MS , P2X2, CS)
X3Y3
//
X ′3Y
′
3 =
f3(MA, P2Y2, CA1)
X3Y
′
3
//
MR =
g(X1X
′
1, X3Y
′
3 , CR)
Fig. 7. An execution of Π with order [S −R− S], where CA0 = 1 and R uses the public channel in round 2.
S (MS ,CS) A (CA0) R (CR)
X1Y1 =
f1(MS , CS)
X1Y1
//
selects
(MA, CA1, CA2),
X ′1Y
′
1 = f2(MA, CA1)
X1Y
′
1
//
X ′2Y
′
2 =
f2(X
′
1Y1, CA2)
X2Y
′
2
oo
X2Y2 =
f2(X1Y
′
1 , CR)
X2Y2
oo
P3X3Y3 =
f3(MS , X2Y
′
2 , CS)
P3X3Y3
//
blocks Y3,
computes M+A =
g(X ′1Y1, P3Y3, CA2)
P3X3
//
MR =
g(X1Y
′
1 , P3X3, CR)
Fig. 8. An execution of Π with order [S −R− S], where CA0 = 1 and S uses the public channel in round 3.
Obviously, it has α = αˆ as (MS , CS) = (MSˆ, CSˆ). The
following is to prove β = βˆ. Since (MA, CA1) = (MAˆ, CAˆ1),
this is equivalent to proving
Pr[CA2 = cA2 ∧ CR = cR | X ]
= Pr[CAˆ2 = cAˆ2 ∧CRˆ = cRˆ | Xˆ ],
(9)
where X denotes the event that (MS , CS) = (mS , cS) ∧
(MA, CA0, CA1) = (mA, cA0, cA1) ∧ E3, and Xˆ denotes
the event that (MSˆ , CSˆ) = (mSˆ , cSˆ) ∧ (MAˆ, CAˆ0, CAˆ1) =
(mAˆ, cAˆ0, cAˆ1) ∧ E3.
Note that CR is uniformly selected by R and CA2 is selected
by A in the first round without seeing any information about
CR. Hence CA2 and CR are independent. Similarly, CAˆ2 and
CRˆ are independent.
Then Eq.(9) can be expressed as
Pr[CA2 = cA2 | X ] Pr[CR = cR | X ]
= Pr[CAˆ2 = cAˆ2 | Xˆ ] Pr[CRˆ = cRˆ | Xˆ ].
Let Φ = {c | f2(X ′1Y1, c) doesn’t use public channel};
where X ′1Y1 comes from X1Y1 = f1(mS , cS) and X ′1Y ′1 =
f1(mA, cA1). Since CA2 is uniformly selected from Φ, we
have Pr[CA2 = cA2 | X ] = 1|Φ| . Furthermore, when Xˆ occurs,
from the definition of W3 we have that CRˆ is in Φ, which
implies Pr[CRˆ = cRˆ | Xˆ ] =
1
|Φ| . Similarly, we get
Pr[CR = cR | X ] = Pr[CAˆ2 = cAˆ2 | Xˆ ].
We thus prove the equality of Eq.(9), which implies that
pE = pEˆ , and then
Pr[M+A = MS | E3] ≥
∑
E∈S3
pEˆ
=
∑
E∈S3
pE
= Pr[MR =MS | E3].
Claim 5: Pr[MR 6= MS | MS 6= MA ∧ E2] ≥ Pr[MR =
MS |MS 6= MA ∧ E2].
Proof: Denote by E2 the set of all executions where E2
occurs. Let S2 ⊆ E2 denote the set of executions in which R
outputs MR = MS given that MA 6= MS .
We define a relation W2 ⊆ E2 × E2 such that (E, Eˆ) ∈
W2 if: (i) CR remains unchanged in the two executions; (ii)
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CAˆ0 ⊕ CA0 = 1; (iii) CA1 = CSˆ , CS = CAˆ1; and (iv) MS =
MAˆ,MA = MSˆ .
Then R cannot distinguish two swapped executions (E, Eˆ)
in W2 and if E ∈ S2, we have Eˆ /∈ S2. Moreover, for any
E ∈ E2, a proof similar to case (ii) in Claim 4 can be used
to prove that pE = pEˆ . We thus have,
Pr[MR 6= MS |MS 6= MA ∧ E2]
= Pr[E /∈ S2]
≥
∑
E∈S2
pEˆ
=
∑
E∈S2
pE
= Pr[MR = MS |MS 6= MA ∧ E2].
From Claim 4 and 5, we have
Pr[M+A =MS ]
≥ Pr[M+A =MS | E1] Pr[E1]
+Pr[M+A = MS | E3] Pr[E3]
≥ Pr[MR = MS ∧ E1] + Pr[MR = MS ∧ E3]
(10)
and
Pr[MR 6= MS ]
≥ Pr[MR 6= MS | E2] Pr[E2]
≥ Pr[MR 6= MS |MS 6= MA ∧ E2]
·Pr[MS 6=MA | E2] Pr[E2]
≥ Pr[MR = MS |MS 6= MA ∧ E2]
·Pr[MS 6=MA ∧ E2]
= Pr[MR = MS ∧ E2]
·(1− Pr[MS = MA |MR =MS ∧ E2])
≥ Pr[MR = MS ∧ E2]− Pr[MA = MS]
(11)
Moreover, we also have Pr[MA = MS] ≤ ε + 1|M| , as
otherwise by choosing M+A to be MA, we have Pr[M
+
A =
MS ] > ε+
1
|M| , which contradicts Lemma 2.
Hence, it has
Pr[M+A =MS ] + Pr[MR 6=MS ]
≥ Pr[MR = MS ∧ E1] + Pr[MR = MS ∧ E3]
+Pr[MR = MS ∧ E2]− Pr[MA = MS ]
= Pr[MR = MS]− Pr[MA =MS ].
Thus, by noting that Pr[M+A = MS ] ≤ ε + 1|M| ,
Pr[MA = MS ] ≤ ε +
1
|M| and Pr[MS 6= MR] ≤ δ,
we get ε+ δ ≥ 12 −
1
|M| . 
2) Proof of Lemma 6: Assume CA0 = 1, we illustrate A’s
strategy as follows.
Round 1: (i) if R uses public channel, A just blocks the t
corrupted wires. Then A selects (MA, CA1)←M× {0, 1}∗,
and sets CA2 = ⊥.
(ii) Otherwise, assume R sends out X1Y1. Consider the
following two sets
Ω1
def
= {c | c ∈ {0, 1}∗ s.t. f1(c) involves no public
channel communication},
Ω2
def
= {c | c ∈ Ω1 s.t. f2(c) involves no public
channel communication}.
Obviously, CR ∈ Ω1. Then if |Ω2| > 0, A selects CA2 ← Ω2;
otherwise, selects CA2 ← Ω1. A also chooses (MA, CA1)←
M × {0, 1}∗, then computes X ′1Y ′1 = f1(CA2) and replaces
Y1 by Y ′1 .
Round 2: (i) if R uses public channel in this round or public
channel has been used in round 1, A just blocks the corrupted
wires. (ii) Otherwise, suppose R responses X2Y2, it has CR ∈
Ω2, then the selection of CA2 ensures that A can produce
message X ′2Y ′2 without public channel communication.A thus
replaces Y2 by Y ′2 .
Round 3: (i) If S sends out P3X3Y3, A just blocks Y3,
and computes M+A = g(P3Y3, CA2). (ii) Otherwise, assume S
sends out X3Y3, it implies that public channel has been used
in the first two rounds, A thus computes X ′3Y ′3 and replaces
Y3 by Y ′3 .
Then by a similar calculation of Eq. (10) and (11), we get
Pr[MR 6= MS]
≥ Pr[MR =MS ∧ E1] + Pr[MR = MS ∧ E2]
−2Pr[MS = MA]
and
Pr[M+A = MS] ≥ Pr[M
+
A =MS ∧ E3]
≥ Pr[MR = MS ∧ E3],
where E1, E2 denote the events that R uses the public channel
in round 1 and 2 respectively, and E3 denotes the event that
S uses the public channel in round 3. Finally we obtain
3ε+ 2δ ≥ 1− 3|M| . 
3) Proof of Lemma 7:
A’s strategy with CA0 = 1 is described as follows.
Round 1: (i) If R uses public channel, A just blocks the t
corrupted wires; (ii) otherwise, assume R sends out X1Y1, A
selects CA2 from the set of
Ω1
def
= {c | c ∈ {0, 1}∗ s.t. f1(c) involves no public
channel communication}
and computes X ′1Y ′1 = f1(CA2), then replaces Y1 by Y ′1 .
In the latter two rounds: (i) If R does not use the public
channel in round 1, it says S will be the invoker of public
channel, thus A just blocks the corrupted wires. (ii) Otherwise,
A chooses (MA, CA1) ← M × {0, 1}∗ and computes X ′2Y ′2
and X ′3Y ′3 , then modifies the corrupted wires.
We note that the impossibility proof in this scenario is
similar to Lemma 5, and thus omit it here. 
